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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Nature of the Case/Course of Proceedings
This matter arises from a complaint, filed by Respondent Erica Klein (“Klein”) against
Appellant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho (“Farmers”), seeking arbitration in an effort to
resolve Klein’s claim for underinsured motorist benefits (“UIM”) as provided in her contract of
insurance. (R., p. 7) Farmers moved for summary judgment based on the argument Klein’s
cause of action accrued either at the time of the underlying accident, or at the time of her
settlement with the third party tortfeasor, and was therefore beyond the five year statute of
limitations period provided in I.C. § 5-216. (R., p. 95)(R., p. 82) The district court denied
summary judgment, finding that because the insurance policy is silent on when a demand for
arbitration must be made, a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether Klein’s
complaint was filed within a reasonable time as determined by the subject matter of the contract
of insurance, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending their performance
under the terms of the contract. (R., p. 232) Upon Farmers’ motion for reconsideration, the
district court clarified its order and confirmed it chose to apply the “breach of contract” rule in
determining when Klein’s cause of action accrued for purposes of application of I.C. § 5-216.
(R., p. 262) Because the issue of when a cause of action for UIM benefits accrues is an issue of
first impression in Idaho, the district court also recommended appellate confirmation of this
issue prior to trial. (R., p. 263).
///
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B.
Statement of Facts
On or about October 10, 2009, Farmers issued a policy of automobile insurance to Klein,
identified as Policy Number 75-17608-01-97 (“the Policy”). (R., p. 107.)
Relevant to these proceedings, the Policy covered Klein’s 2008 Chevrolet Malibu, was
effective from October 10, 2009, through April 10, 2010, and provided $500,000 in UIM
benefits. (R., p. 108.)
Pursuant to the terms of the Policy, Coverage C for uninsured coverage, which also
includes underinsured motorist coverage, states:
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of
bodily injury sustained by the insured person. The bodily injury must be caused
by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured
motor vehicle. Determination as to whether an insured person is legally entitled
to recover damages or the amount of damages shall be made by agreement
between the insured person and us. If no agreement is reached, the decision will
be made by arbitration.
(R., p. 175.)
Pursuant to the terms of the Policy, there is a mandatory arbitration provision which
states:
If an insured person and we do not agree (1) that the person is legally entitled to
recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, or
(2) as to the amount of payment under this part, either that person or we may
demand that the issue be determined by arbitration.
In that event, an arbitrator will be selected by the insured person and us. If
agreement on an arbitrator cannot be reached within (30) days, the judge of a court
having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The expense of the arbitrator and all
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other expenses of arbitration will be shared equally. Attorney’s fees and fees paid
for the witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the party
incurring them.
The arbitrator shall determine (1) the existence of the operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle, (2) that the insured person is legally entitled to recover damages
from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, and (3) the amount of
payment under this part as determined by this policy or any other applicable policy.
Arbitration will take place in the county where the insured person lives. Local
court rules governing procedures and evidence will apply. The decision in writing
of the arbitrator will be binding subject to the terms of this insurance.
Formal demand for arbitration shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The court shall be located in the county and state of residence of the party making
the demand. Demand may also be made by sending a certified letter to the party
against whom arbitration is sought, with a return receipt as evidence.
(R., p. 177.)
On February 1, 2010, Klein was driving her 2008 Chevrolet Malibu when her vehicle
was t-boned by a vehicle driven by a third party tortfeasor insured by Allstate Insurance. (R., p.
150.)
Klein was injured in the accident and retained Ryan Lewis (“Lewis”) to represent her.
(R., p. 152.)
On December 14, 2010, Lewis provided Mike Morrissey (“Morrissey”), the Farmers’
adjuster assigned to Klein’s UIM claim, a copy of Klein’s demand package sent to Allstate
requesting settlement for the Allstate policy limits of $25,000. (R., p. 58.)
Allstate subsequently offered to resolve Klein’s liability claim against the tortfeasor for
the full policy limits and Lewis notified Morrissey of Allstate’s offer. On January 4, 2011,
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Lewis received confirmation from Morrissey that Farmers had been advised of the Allstate offer
and was giving Klein permission to resolve her third party claim. (R., p. 154.) (R., p. 156.)
On April 25, 2011, Klein resolved her third party claim with Allstate Insurance for the
full liability limits of $25,000. (R., p. 109.)
On November 7, 2012, pursuant to I.C. 41-1839, Lewis submitted Klein’s UIM demand
package to Morrissey with a proof of loss demand in the sum of $250,000.00. (R., p. 67.)
On December 12, 2012, Morrissey extended an offer to resolve Klein’s UIM claim for
the sum of $75,000. (R., p. 37.)
On December 13, 2012, Farmers issued a check to Klein in the amount of $75,000 for the
undisputed portion of the UIM benefits owed to her pursuant to I.C. 41-1839. (R., p. 38.)
On December 13, 2012, Lewis clarified and Morrissey acknowledged that the $75,000
payment was for the undisputed portion of Klein’s UIM benefits and did not resolve or
otherwise constitute a final settlement and that Klein’s UIM claim would be kept open, subject
to her future medical needs. (R., pp. 97, 99, 104, 106.)
On January 30, 2013, Lewis acknowledged the assignment of Dan Emerson (“Emerson”)
as the new adjuster for Farmers and provided him with a status of Klein’s ongoing medical
treatment. (R., p. 40.)
On July 7, 2013, Emerson confirmed discussions with Mr. Lewis and requested updated
medical information. (R., p. 41.)
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On November 5, 2013, Dan Surmelis (“Surmelis”) advised Lewis that Klein’s UIM
claim had been assigned to him and suggested mediation as an option to try to resolve the claim.
(R., p. 42.)
On December 1, 2013, Surmelis again advised Lewis of his assignment as the new
adjuster for Klein’s UIM claim and requested information concerning the medical treatment
Klein had received since Farmers’ initial evaluation. (R., p. 43.)
On January 22, 2014, Surmelis confirmed discussions with Lewis concerning the status
of Klein’s UIM claim which included possible mediation following review of Klein’s updated
medical information. (R., p. 44.)
On July 7, 2016, the undersigned (“Lyon”) advised Surmelis that Klein had changed
counsel and of Klein’s intent to submit a supplemental demand package with updated medical
information in an effort to reach a final resolution of her UIM claim. Lyon also asked if
Farmers’ preference was still to try to resolve the matter by way of mediation. (R., p. 45.)
On August 12, 2016, Surmelis acknowledged Lyon’s representation of Klein. Surmelis
also advised Lyon of Klein’s obligations under the Policy, of the $75,000 payment previously
tendered, and of the arbitration provision of the Policy. Surmelis also indicated that Farmers
was prepared to respond to any demand for payment under the terms of Klein’s policy within
sixty (60) days of receipt of the proof of loss. (R., p. 46.)
In subsequent discussions with Lyon, Surmelis confirmed that Klein’s UIM claim was
still open and that Farmers was still agreeable to resolving her claim by way of mediation. (R.,
p. 160.)
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On February 17, 2017, Lyon provided Surmelis with Klein’s supplemental demand
package requesting the balance of her UIM benefits. (R., p. 48.)
On or about April 4, 2017, in discussions with Lyon, Surmelis confirmed receipt of
Klein’s demand package and advised that he had completed his evaluation of the claim and that
his evaluation had been sent to his supervisors. Surmelis also advised he was waiting for a
response from his supervisors and was therefore requesting a two week extension to respond to
Klein’s supplemental demand. (R., p. 160.)
On April 4, 2017, Lyon granted Surmelis a two week extension to respond to Klein’s
supplemental UIM demand. (R., p. 161.)
On May 17, 2017, Lyon requested an update from Surmelis concerning the status of
Klein’s UIM claim. (R., p. 161.)
On or about May 19, 2017, Lyon received a telephone call from attorney Gary Cooper
(“Cooper”) indicating he was representing Farmers. Cooper advised Lyon that Farmers believed
Klein’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. After briefly discussing the issue, both
Lyon and Cooper agreed to research the issue further and exchange their findings. (R., p. 161.)
On June 26, 2017, Lyon forwarded a letter to Cooper concerning Lyon’s research on the
issue of the application of the statute of limitations on Klein’s UIM claim. (R., p. 116.)
On July 11, 2017, Cooper provided Lyon with Cooper’s research concerning the
application of the statute of limitations on Klein’s UIM Claim. At that time, Cooper, on behalf
of Farmers, also inquired as to whether Klein wished to participate in mediation in an effort to
resolve her UIM claim. (R., p. 123.)
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Klein agreed, and on September 22, 2017, the parties participated in mediation in an
attempt to resolve Klein’s UIM claim. The mediation was unsuccessful. (R., p. 161.)
On October 26, 2017, due to the inability of the parties to agree on a value of Klein’s
UIM claim, Lyon advised Farmers that it appeared the issue would need to be resolved through
arbitration pursuant to the terms of her policy and put Farmers on notice that Klein intended to
seek pre-judgment/pre-arbitration interest and attorneys fees as provided under I.C. 41-1839
unless other alternatives could be reached. (R., p. 128.)
On November 21, 2017, Cooper, acknowledged receipt of Lyon’s October 26, 2017 letter
and interpreted it as a demand for arbitration. At that time, Farmers proposed an arbitrator. As
well, Cooper advised that he was seeking authority from Farmers to file a Declaratory Relief
Action to resolve the statute of limitations issue. (R., p. 130.)
On November 21, 2017, Lyon responded to Cooper’s email clarifying that the October
26, 2017 was not intended as a formal demand for arbitration. Rather, Lyon advised that a
formal demand would be filed with the court pursuant to the terms of the Policy. (R., p. 132.)
On November 22, 2017, Klein filed her Complaint seeking an order from the district
court compelling arbitration as provided under her policy of insurance. (R., p. 7.)
On November 28, 2017, Lyon provided Cooper with a courtesy copy of the Summons
and Complaint, together with the names of potential arbitrators Klein was willing to agree to.
(R., p. 135.)
On February 21, 2018, Farmers filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., p. 95.)
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court correctly determined that Klein’s cause of action to compel
arbitration to resolve her claim for underinsured motorist benefits does not accrue for
purposes of application of the statute of limitations until there has been a breach of the
insurance contract.
2. Whether the district court correctly determined that a genuine issue of material fact
exists concerning whether Klein’s cause of action to compel arbitration was made
within a reasonable time as determined by the subject matter of the contract of
insurance, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the
performance of the contract.
ARGUMENT
I.
DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED KLEIN’S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE
“BREACH OF CONTRACT” RULE
The district court correctly recognized that “[t]he relationship between Klein and Farmers
is contractual in nature.” (R., p. 262) As such, the district court correctly chose to apply the
“breach of contract” rule, rather than the “date of accident” rule or the “settlement/judgment”
rule, in determining when Klein’s cause of action to compel arbitration for UIM benefits accrued
for purposes of application of I.C. 5-216. As set forth below, the district court’s analysis is
consistent with the majority rule applied by other jurisdictions, is consistent with Idaho law, and
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is consistent with the arbitration provision in the insurance policy at issue in this case.
Accordingly, the district court’s decision should be affirmed.
A.
The Majority of Jurisdictions Apply the “Breach of Contract” Rule
Because the relationship between Klein and Farmers is governed by the policy of
insurance, the applicable statute of limitations is five years as provided in I.C. § 5-216. Farmers
correctly notes these points are not in dispute and that the dispute between the parties lies in
when Klein’s cause of action accrues. (App.Br., p. 8.) Although Idaho has not had to
opportunity to consider the issue of when a cause of action for UIM benefits accrues, the
majority of other jurisdictions which have considered the issue have favored the “breach of
contract” rule as applied by the district court.1

Jurisdictions which have adopted the majority view include: McDonnell v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 299 P.3d 715 (Alaska 2013); Am States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam,
69 A.3d 831 (R.I. 2013); Snyder v. Case, 611 N.W.2d 409 (Neb. 2000); Eidemiller v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 P.2d 161 (Kan.Ct.App. 1996), reversed on other grounds, 933 P.2d 748
(Kan. 1997); Brooks v. State Farm Ins. Co., 154 P.3d 697 (N.M.Ct.App. 2007); Blutreich v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1167 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1991); Spear v. California State Auto. Ass’n,
831 P.2d 821 (Ca. 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Spinelli, 443 A.2d 1286 (Del.1982); Norfleet v.
Safeway Ins. Co., 494 N.E.2d 720 (Ill.App. 1986); Whitten v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 647
A.2d 808 (Me. 1994); Palmero v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 606 A.2d 797 (Me. 1992); Lane
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 582 A.2d 501 (Md. 1990); Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burbank, 664
N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1996); Jacobs v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exchange, 309 N.W.2d 627
(Mich. 1981); Grayson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 971 P.2d 798 (Nev. 1998); Metropolitan
Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 620 A.2d 1020 (N.H. 1993); Wille v. Geico Cas. Co., 2 P.3d
888 (Okla. 2000); Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 95 (Or. 1996), superseded by statute on
other grounds; Webster v. Allstate Ins. Co., 833 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Ct.App. 1992); Schwindt v.
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 353 (Wash. 2000); Plumley v. May, 434 S.E.2d 406 (W.Va.
1993).
1
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The rationale in favor of the “breach of contract” rule has been stated as follows:
As a general matter, “a cause of action accrues and the applicable statute of
limitations begins to run at the time of the injury to the aggrieved party.”
Additionally, as we explained in Pickering, an insured’s action against his or her
UM/UIM carrier is an action for breach of contract:
Although a tortious injury is an incidental element in the insured’s
suit against his [or her] insurer over a policy contract, the action is
fundamentally one in contract. The plaintiff here would have no
action if it were not for the coverage provided by her insurance
policy. The insurer’s liability rises solely from the insurance
contract and nothing else.
In light of these well-established principles, we are satisfied that the insured is not
injured by his or her UM/UIM carrier and, therefore, has no right to seek judicial
relief against the insurer unless and until the insurer breaches the insurance contract.
“That breach does not occur until the insurer refuses payment (or arbitration if
applicable).”
American States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam, 69 A.3d 831, 840-41 (R.I. 2013)(citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
B.
The “Breach of Contract” Rule is Most Consistent with Idaho Law
Despite the overwhelming number of jurisdictions which have adopted the “breach of
contract” rule, Farmers maintains the rule has proven to be “unworkable” and “has fallen out of
favor.” (App.Br., p. 8-9.) However, Farmers fails to cite any authority in support of these
assertions. Indeed, in apparent contradiction to Farmers’ position, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in Erie Ins. Exch. v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578 (Pa. 2017), recently addressed the issue of
when a cause of action accrued in the context of UM and UIM benefits and recognized that the
majority of jurisdictions have adopted the “breach of contract” rule over the other two rules.
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Furthermore, although the Bristol decision was quite extensive in its analysis, there was no
reference to any authority that has suggested the “breach of contract” rule has fallen out of favor
as proposed by Farmers.
Nevertheless, Farmers contends the “breach of contract” rule is unworkable because it
“not only indefinitely extends the time within which to make a UIM claim, but also leads to
uncertainty as whether and when an insurer breaches its insurance policy with its insureds.”
(App.Br., p. 8.) However, these conclusions ignore the well-recognized legal principle that an
insurance policy will be interpreted similar to any other contract. As stated in Armstrong v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 205 P.3d 1203 (2009):
When interpreting insurance policies, this Court applies the general rules of
contract law subject to certain special canons of construction. Whether an insurance
policy is ambiguous is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. Where policy language is found to be unambiguous, this Court is to
construe the policy as written, and the Court by construction cannot create a liability
not assumed by the insurer nor make a new contract for the parties, or one different
from that plainly intended, nor add words to the contract of insurance to either
create or avoid liability. Unless contrary intent is shown, common, non-technical
words are given the meaning applied by laymen in daily usage--as opposed to the
meaning derived from legal usage--in order to effectuate the intent of the parties.
Where there is an ambiguity in an insurance contract, special rules of construction
apply to protect the insured. Under these special rules, because insurance contracts
are adhesion contracts, typically not subject to negotiation between the parties, any
ambiguity that exists in the contract must be construed most strongly against the
insurer. In determining whether a particular provision is ambiguous, the provision
must be read within the context in which it occurs in the policy.
147 Idaho at 69-70, 205 P.3d at 1205-06 (citations and internal quotations omitted.) As well,
these conclusions ignore the fact that “[a] cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations
begins to run when a cause of action exists.” Swafford v. Huntsman Springs, Inc., 163 Idaho
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209, 212, 409 P.3d 789, 792 (2017), quoting Lido Van and Storage, Inc. v. Kuck, 110 Idaho 939,
942, 719 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1986)(emphasis added).
Thus, whether an insured has timely asserted a claim and whether the parties have
complied with the terms and conditions of the insurance policy is determined in the same
manner as any other contractual relationship, i.e., by reviewing the terms and conditions of the
contract. Furthermore, “‘[w]here no time is expressed in a contract for its performance, the law
implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time as determined by the subject matter of
the contract, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance.’”
Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 318, 233 P.3d 1221, 1240
(2010), quoting Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43, 382 P.2d 906,908 (1963). In light
of these principles, there is certainly nothing unique or unusual in the way an insurance policy is
interpreted to suggest the “breach of contract” rule is “unworkable.” See also, Erie Ins. Exch. v.
Bristol, 174 A.3d 578, 589 (Pa. 2017)(“Absent a compelling public policy ground or legislative
intent, we conclude there is no reason to create a special rule for determining when the statute of
limitations starts to run in UM cases.”)
Farmers also argues that the “breach of contract” rule is inconsistent with Idaho law,
particularly this Court’s decision in Hill v. Am. Family Mut Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619, 249 P.3d
812 (2011), which invalidated an “exhaustion clause” requiring an insured to exhaust the full
limits of the tortfeasor’s insurance policy before being eligible for UIM benefits. Given an
Idaho insured can now make a UIM claim immediately following an accident, Farmers
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maintains there is “no longer a reason to delay the accrual of the statute of limitations for
pursuing UIM claims. (App.Br. p. 9.)
However, Farmers’ logic is flawed and confuses the claim process with a legal cause of
action. Simply because an Idaho insured can now seek UIM benefits prior to exhausting the
liability limits of the third party tortfeasor does not mean that an Idaho insured has an immediate
cause of action against the insurer following the accident. In fact, one of the main policy
considerations in support of the Court’s decision in Hill was the recognition that “[p]ublic policy
favors resolution of controversies and uncertainties through compromise and settlement rather
than through litigation.” 150 Idaho at 627, citing 15A Am.Jur.2d Compromise and Settlement §
5. Thus, it was not the intent of Hill to create a cause of action for UIM benefits at the time of
the accident. Rather, the intent of Hill was to give the insured the right to accept the best
settlement available against the tortfeasor without relinquishing under-insurance protection.
150 Idaho at 626. Once a claim is made, the UIM carrier must still “investigate and attempt to
resolve the claim in good faith regardless of whether the insured settled with the tortfeasor’s
insurer or, if so, for how much. The UIM carrier will receive credit for the full amount of the
tortfeasor’s policy, regardless of the insured’s actual recovery.” 150 Idaho at 627-28 (citation
omitted.) Although not addressed in Hill, how the UIM claim should thereafter be resolved and
how the rights and obligations of the parties should be determined would appear to depend on
the language of the insurance policy.
Indeed, it is contractual relationship between the parties which gives rise to the “breach
of contract” rule because it would be inconsistent to allow for a cause of action to accrue before
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the insurer has been asked to perform under the contract of insurance. This rationale applies
even in those jurisdictions which have invalidated the application of an exhaustion clause as
Idaho has done. As stated in Grayson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 114 Nev. 1379, 971 P.2d
798 (1998):
This case presents an issue of first impression in Nevada: When does the statute of
limitations begin to run on a cause of action for benefits under an UIM provision
of an automobile policy? Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed this issue
and the overwhelming majority of these jurisdictions have concluded that the
limitations period begins to run on a UIM claim upon the insurer’s breach of the
insurance contract.
These cases are based on the rationale that it would be illogical to begin the statute
of limitations before the insured even has a justiciable claim for breach of contract.
Although our UIM statutory scheme provides the insured with the option to file a
suit against her UIM carrier prior to obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor, if
the insured chooses not to do so, an action for breach of contract will not lie at the
time of the accident because the UIM carrier has not yet been called upon to fulfill
a promise under the contract.
Moreover, practically speaking, it would be fundamentally unfair to time-bar an
insured from compensation she bargained for because an insured may not be aware
until long after the accident that she will need to pursue a claim against her UIM
insurer. Specifically, at the time of the accident or even several years thereafter,
the insured may not know the extent of her injuries, the amount of the tortfeasor’s
available coverage, or whether the cost of her medical treatment will exceed the
value of the tortfeasor’s insurance policy and available assets.
114 Nev. at 1381-82 (citations omitted.)
This Court has consistently focused on the contractual relationship of the parties in
determining the rights and obligations between an insurer and the insured. For example, in
Sullivan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 111 Idaho 304, 723 P.2d 848 (1986)(Sullivan I), the Court
specifically rejected the proposition that an insurance carrier steps into the shoes of the
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uninsured motorist resulting in a relationship which is always adversarial. The Court
strengthened this position in Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,
233 P.3d 1221 (2010), inding that an insurance company’s obligation to pay uninsured motorist
benefits is based on terms of the contract of insurance. 149 Idaho 318. It is this contractual
obligation which establishes a duty on the part of the insurance company to act in good faith
even when its insured makes a claim under the UM coverage of the policy because “[t]he
covenant requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations contained in their
agreement.” 149 Idaho at 317, citing Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 562, 212 P.3d
982, 992 (2009)(emphasis added).
Likewise, in Walden v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 131 Idaho 18, 951 P.2d 949
(1998), the Court considered the import of an arbitration provision when determining whether a
contract of insurance had been breached. Specifically, Walden involved claims for breach of
contract and bad faith brought by the Walden against Nationwide based on Nationwide’s failure
to pay UM benefits. 131 Idaho at 19. Walden had submitted a proof of loss to Nationwide
demanding the policy limits under her policy. Id. Nationwide advised Walden that it did not
believe her claim was a limits case and demanded arbitration. Id. Walden’s policy had an
arbitration clause requiring arbitration if the insured and the insurer could not agree on either the
insured’s right to recover damages from an uninsured motorist, or the amount of the damages the
insured was entitled to. Id.
Nationwide subsequently advised Walden of the name of the arbitrator it was
designating pursuant to the arbitration provision. Id. Walden did not designate an arbitrator,
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but instead filed suit alleging breach of contract and bad faith based on Nationwide’s failure to
pay the policy limits. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nationwide,
in relevant part, on a finding that Walden had “not shown a breach of contract or any other
grounds for supporting a suit against the defendant.” 131 Idaho at 20. In affirming the
decision of the district court, this Court agreed that Nationwide was not in breach of the
contract, finding:
A term of the policy is that the parties will submit to binding arbitration to
determine the amount of damages, if that amount is in dispute. In this case the
amount of damages was in dispute. By refusing to designate an arbitrator, Walden
was the party who failed to comply with the terms of the policy, not Nationwide.
Nationwide was entitled to have the amount of damages determined in arbitration.
Nationwide was not in breach of contract and did not act in bad faith in relying on
the provisions of the arbitration agreement.
131 Idaho at 20.
Despite the plethora of Idaho case law focusing on the contractual relationship between
the insurer and the insured, and despite the rationale that it would be illogical to begin the statute
of limitations before the insured even has a justiciable claim for breach of contract, Farmres
maintains that the “date of accident” rule is more consistent with Idaho law. Farmers argues that
Idaho should consider the “date of accident” rule because of the advantage it offers by providing
an accrual date which is objectively certain. (App.Br., p. 10.) However, the reasoning behind
the “date of accident” rule is based on the premise “that the insured’s claim for UIM benefits
derives from the tort claim against the underinsured tortfeasor and that the insurer essentially
stands in the shoes of the tortfeasor.” Hamm v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 612 N.W.2d
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775, 782 (Iowa 2000). As noted above, this reasoning is inconsistent with this Court’s decisions
in Sullivan, Weinstein and Walden.
Nevertheless, as support for its position, Farmers relies on Swafford v. Huntsman
Springs, Inc., 163 Idaho 209, 409 P.3d 789 (2017). In that case, the Swaffords brought suit
against Huntsman Springs alleging breach of contract, breach of an express warranty, and breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of a contract to purchase undeveloped
property. 163 Idaho at 211. The Swaffords claimed that Huntsman Springs breached its contract
with them by failing to provide access to an adjacent street as required in the master plan which
the Swaffords claim they relied upon when entering into the purchase contract. Id. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Huntsman Springs, finding the Swaffords were on
constructive notice of the breach based on improvements which were made next to their property
which did not provide the agreed upon access. Id. Because these improvements were made
prior to the five year statute of limitations, the district court found that the Swaffords’ claims
were timed barred. Id.
On appeal, this Court affirmed. Importantly, the Court’s decision centered on the terms
and conditions of the contract and the master plan. Specifically, because there was no time
period expressed in either document for Huntsman Springs to provide the agreed upon access,
the Court imposed a reasonable time as determined by the subject matter of the contract, the
situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance. 163 Idaho at 213.
Applying this doctrine, the Court reasoned that if a reasonable time had run to provide the
claimed access then the cause of action accrued at the time the improvements were made and the
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claims were time barred. Id. On the other hand, if a reasonable time had not run, then the
construction of the improvements constituted an anticipatory breach of contract and the statute
of limitations had still run. Id. Critical to the Court’s decision was a finding that the Swaffords
were on notice of an anticipatory breach of contract which the Court defined as “a repudiation
[by the promisor] of his contractual duty before the time fixed in the contract for his
performance has arrived.” 163 Idaho at 213, citing Foley v. Munio, 105 Idaho 309, 311, 669
P.2d 198, 200 (1983).
Based on the Court’s analysis, which is layered in contract interpretation, it is unclear
how Swafford supports the “date of accident” rule as suggested by Farmers. If anything,
Swafford reinforces this Court’s preference in allowing the terms and conditions of the contract
to control the rights and obligations of the parties. Again this approach is most consistent with
the “breach of contract” rule.
The final alternative recognized in some jurisdictions and proposed by Farmers as an
alternative to the “breach of contract” rule is the “settlement/judgment” rule which states that the
UIM claim accrues on the date of settlement with, or judgment against, the third party tortfeasor.
However, even Farmers recognizes that this rule is inconsistent with Idaho law because it is has
been applied to prevent the injustice created by an exhaustion clause which, as discussed above,
has been deemed void in Idaho. See e.g., Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401 (Minn.
2000).2 Furthermore, the reasoning offered in support of this rule, that being the notation that

Oanes is also distinguishable because the decision was necessary to address prior
Minnesota case law which characterized a cause of action for UIM benefits as an action to
2
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the UIM claimant would be able to postpone indefinitely the commencement of the limitations
period by not submitting the claim, has been criticized by several courts. See e.g., Palmero v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 606 A.2d 797 (Me. 1992)(insured not injured by his UIM carrier
and, therefore, has no right to seek judicial relief against the insurer unless and until the insurer
breaches the insurance contract which occurs when insurer refuses payment or arbitration if
applicable); McDonnell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 299 P.3d 715 (Alaska
2013)(insurance company can require insured to make a claim or notice of potential claim within
a certain period of time without requiring the insured to file suit); Am States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam,
69 A.3d 831 (R.I. 2013)(court hard-pressed to envision a scenario in which an insured who is in
need of benefits and who has viable UIM claim would delay asserting the claim and remain less
than fully compensated any longer than is necessary).
The other cases cited by Farmers are also distinguishable. For example, several of the
cases are based on specific state authority. See e.g., Brown v. American Family Ins. Group, 989
P.2d 196 (Colo.App. 1999)(decided within backdrop of specific state statute delineating the
statute of limitations for UIM claim and defining the time of accrual as the time when both the
damages and cause of damages are known or should have been known); Yocherer v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 643 N.W.2d 457 (Wis. 2002)(decision based on existing state law which

establish an “implied-in-law contract” which accrued on the date of the accident. Furthermore,
the Oanes Court relied in part on Pennsylvania authority which has been subsequently
overturned by Erie Ins. Exch. v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578 (Pa. 2017), wherein the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court announced its adoption of the majority breach of contract rule. Finally, Oanes
did not involve the issue of specific performance of an arbitration provision as presented in this
case.
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states that that, for insurance policies, the date of loss controls the accrual of the statute of
limitations); Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 880 So. 2d 336 (Miss. 2004)(decision
based on state statute and policy language which required notice of claim once insured knows
that his or her damages exceed the limits of liability coverage of the alleged tortfeasor).
The remaining cases cited by Farmers are actually consistent with the Klein’s position.
For example, both Consiglio v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 737 A.2d 969 (Conn.App. 1999), and
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Perez-Henderson, 714 A.2d 1281 (Conn. 1998), determined
that the respective insureds had timely filed their application to compel arbitration given the
language of the insurance policy which required them to exhaust all the limits of all the
underlying liability insurance and which was silent as to the date by which a demand for
arbitration had to be made. Similarly, in North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 446 S.E.2d 364 (N.C. App. (1994), the court, in determining when the statute of
limitations accrued for the purposes of a contribution action following the insolvency of the
tortfeasor’s carrier, found that the cause of action did not accrue at the time of the accident, but
rather the “cause of action accrues when the injured party is at liberty to sue.” 446 S.E.2d at
369. Finally, in Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Imperiale, 598 N.Y.S.2d 685 (N.Y. 1993), the court
denied a stay of arbitration based on a finding that the exhaustion provision in the policy was a
condition precedent to the accrual of the cause of action, and therefore the request for arbitration
was not beyond the six year statute of limitations despite the fact that the demand for arbitration
was made over ten years after the accident.
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As can be seen, Idaho law is most consistent with the “breach of contract” rule. Not only
does Idaho law emphasize the contractual relationship created by the policy of insurance, but it
also recognizes that a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when a
cause of action exists. Farmers’ concern that the adoption of the “breach of contract” rule will
indefinitely postpone the commencement of the limitations period for a cause of action for UIM
benefits, and therefore a special rule should be adopted to curtail this possibility, is simply not
warranted. As noted by the district court, when a contract is silent on the time of performance,
Idaho law implies a reasonable time as determined by the subject matter of the contract of
insurance, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance of the
contract. This principle affords sufficient protections against an insured unreasonably delaying
either the claim process or the arbitration process, while at the same time giving due deference to
the parties’ performance as governed by the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance.
C.
The “Breach of Contract” Rule is Most Consistent with the
Arbitration Provision found in Klein’s Insurance Policy
As set forth above, the insurance policy in question unambiguously mandates arbitration
when an agreement cannot be reached concerning the value of the UIM claim. Specifically, the
Policy states: “Determination as to whether an insured person is legally entitled to recover
damages or the amount of damages shall be made by agreement between the insured person and
us. If no agreement is reached, the decision will be made by arbitration.” (R., p. 175.)
Importantly, the policy allows either party to demand arbitration. (R., p. 177.) An almost
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identical arbitration provision was the subject of the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Spear v. California State Auto. Assn., 831 P.2d 821 (Cal. 1992), which adopted the “breach of
contract” rule in California.
Spear involved a petition to compel arbitration filed by Spear against CSAA for UM
benefits which CSAA opposed on the argument the action was barred by the statute of
limitations. 831 P.2d at 822. Although Spear had timely filed a lawsuit against the uninsured
driver and had timely notified CSAA of his intent to pursue a UM claim, the claim was delayed
pending the completion of Spear’s associated worker’ compensation action. Id. When the
worker’s comp action was resolved almost five years later, Spear notified CSAA of the
settlement and his intent to negotiate his UM claim. Id. CSAA responded that it would not
settle the claim, and if a petition for arbitration was filed, it would attempt to dismiss the action
based on a statute of limitations defense. Id.
Spear subsequently filed a petition to compel CSAA into arbitration to resolve the UM
claim. Id. The lower courts denied the petition, finding in relevant part, that the statute of
limitations began to run when Spear filed his lawsuit against the uninsured motorist. Id.
However, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding Spear’s claim did not accrue until
CSAA refused to arbitrate the controversy. 831 P.2d at 827.
///
///
///
///
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At issue in Spear was an arbitration provision which stated:
“If an insured person making claim under this Part and we do not agree that such
person is legally entitled to recover damages …., or if so entitled, do not agree as
to the amount, then either party, on written demand of the other … shall institute
arbitration proceedings….”
831 P.2d at 823. Applying this language, the Spear Court reasoned that the action to
compel arbitration was akin to a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract.
831 P.2d at 824. As well, given the condition that arbitration was not required until an
agreement could not be reached between the parties, the Court also determined that there
could be no breach of the contract while the parties were negotiating in good faith before
submitting to arbitration. 831 P.2d at 825. Rather, the contract is breached only when one
party has refused to arbitrate the controversy. Id. It is at that time that the cause of action
to compel arbitration accrues. Id.
The Spear decision exemplifies the consistency between the “breach of contract” rule
and the application of the arbitration provision in Klein’s insurance policy. It is also consistent
with Walden v. Nationwide Insurance Company, supra, discussed above, which also considered
the import of an arbitration provision when determining whether a contract of insurance had
been breached. Given these decisions, it would be contrary to the express terms of Klein’s
contract of insurance to now establish an accrual date that is detached from the arbitration
provision imposed by Farmers. Such a result would be fundamentally unfair as it would
arbitrarily divest Klein of the benefits she contracted for and would excuse Farmers from its
joint obligation to resolve the claim either by agreement, or through arbitration.
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II.
DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT A GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACTS EXISTS AS TO WHETHER KLEIN’S COMPLAINT TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION WAS FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
In denying Farmers’ motion for summary judgment and subsequent motion for
reconsideration, the district court correctly recognized Klein’s action to compel arbitration is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance which does not provide a time
period by which the parties must demand arbitration. (R., pp. 238-39.) Relying on Weinstein,
supra, the district court also correctly recognized that when a contract is silent on the time for
performance the law implies performance within a reasonable time as determined by the subject
matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending their
performance. (R., p. 238.) Finally, the Court correctly identified the issue of what constitutes a
reasonable time as an issue of fact. (R., p. 239.)
As noted above, Farmers acknowledged that the payment of the $75,000 did not
represent full and final payment to Klein and that her UIM claim would be kept open subject to
her ongoing medical needs. (R., pp. 104, 106.) At no time did Farmers indicate Klein’s claim
would be denied, closed, or that it would no longer negotiate with her in an attempt to reach a
final resolution of her claim. Indeed, Farmers subsequently confirmed Klein’s claim was still
open and confirmed it was still willing to participate in mediation as necessary to resolve her
claim. (R., p. 160.) As well, following the submission of the supplemental demand package,
Surmelis acknowledged that he had evaluated the claim and submitted his evaluation to his
supervisors and needed a two week extension to reply to the demand. (R., p. 160.) It was only
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after subsequent attempts to follow up with the status of Farmers’ response that Farmers,
through Cooper, first raised the issue of the statute of limitations. (R., p. 161.)
More importantly, even in light of this legal issue, negotiations continued. Specifically,
both parties agreed to exchange their findings concerning their respective research on the statute
of limitations. (R., pp. 161, 116, 123.) After this occurred, both parties agreed to participate in
mediation in an effort to reach a final resolution of the claim. (R., p. 161.) Once the mediation
proved unsuccessful, Klein promptly notified Farmers of her belief that arbitration would be
necessary to resolve her claim and then timely filed her demand for arbitration as provided for
under the terms of the Policy. (R., p. 128.)
Based on the foregoing, the district court correctly concluded that a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether Klein’s action was made within a reasonable time as
determined by the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the
circumstances attending the parties’ performance.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly denied Farmers’ motion for summary judgment given that a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Klein’s complaint to compel arbitration
pursuant to the terms of her insurance policy was made within a reasonable time, taking into
consideration the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the
circumstances attending their performance. Summary judgment was also appropriate as Klein’s
cause of action could not have accrued as a matter of law until there was a breach of the
insurance contract, either by Farmers denying her claim, or by Farmers refusing to participate in
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arbitration. As there has been no breach of the insurance contract, Klein's action has not
accrued for purposes of application of the five year limitations period set forth in LC. 5-216.
Accordingly, the orders of the district court should be affirmed and this matter returned
to the district court for a determination of whether Klein's cause of action was made within a
reasonable time.
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